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Abstract

This paper examines the causes of conflict in Burundi and discusses strategies for
building peace. The analysis of the complex relationships between distribution and
group dynamics reveals that these relationships are reciprocal, implying that distribution
and group dynamics are endogenous. The nature of endogenously generated group
dynamics determines the type of preferences (altruistic or exclusionist), which in turn
determines the type of allocative institutions and policies that prevail in the political and
economic system. While unequal distribution of resources may be socially inefficient, it
nonetheless can be rational from the perspective of the ruling elite, especially because
inequality perpetuates dominance. However, because unequal distribution of resources
generates conflict, maintaining a system based on inequality is difficult because it
requires ever increasing investments in repression. It is therefore clear that if the new
Burundian leadership is serious about building peace, it must engineer institutions that
uproot the legacy of discrimination and promote equal opportunity for social mobility for
all members of ethnic groups and regions.

*

Earlier drafts of this paper were presented at the UNU/WIDER conference on “Making Peace Work”,
Helsinki, Finland, June 4-5, 2004, and at the Five-College African Studies Council on December 9, 2004.
The author is grateful for constructive comments from participants to seminars where this paper was
presented. Special thanks go to Ralph Faulkingham, Frank Holmquist, and David Newburry in the FiveCollege African Studies Council.

1. Introduction
Since the past decade, sub-Saharan Africa has suffered a disproportionate share of civil wars and
peace in conflict-affected countries has been fragile and short lived (Bigombe, Collier and
Sambanis 2000). Countries fall back into civil war when the end of conflict is not accompanied
by strategies explicitly aimed at addressing the root causes of conflict.

In the case of Burundi, we argue that civil wars arise from distributional conflict and that
achieving political stability will require the establishment of institutional mechanisms that
correct the legacy of inequality in access to economic and political power across ethnic groups
and regions. This argument is based on an analysis of the complex relationships between
distribution and group dynamics. The relation between distribution and group dynamics is
reciprocal, implying that distribution and group dynamics are endogenous.

Distribution of economic resources and political power may be equal or unequal.

Equal

distribution of resources promotes cohesive group dynamics while unequal distribution creates
antagonism between the privileged groups and the marginalized ones. In turn, the nature of
endogenously generated group dynamics determines the type of preferences which may be
altruistic or exclusionist. These preferences in turn determine the type of allocative institutions
and policies that prevail in the political and economic system. Altruistic preferences promote
egalitarian and nationalistic policies while exclusionist preferences induce sectarian and
inegalitarian allocative policies.

Hence the distribution of national resources (economic

resources and political power) is endogenous in the sense that equality or inequality arise from
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the type of allocative policies that prevail in the system. These relationships are summarized in
Figure 1.
Figure 1: Group dynamics and distributional conflict
Group dynamics
(cohesive or antagonistic)

Preferences
(nationalistic or
exclusionist)

Distribution
(equal or
unequal)

Allocative policies
(egalitarian or sectarian)

It also follows from the foregoing analysis that while unequal distribution of resources may be
socially inefficient, it nonetheless can be “rational” from the perspective of the ruling elite,
especially because inequality perpetuates dominance.

For example, the concentration of

education infrastructure in the southern province of Bururi in Burundi led to sub-optimal human
capital development (Ngaruko and Nkurunziza 2000; Jackson 2000). Yet this policy was a vital
mechanism of consolidation of power for the southern Tutsi oligarchy. Obviously, because of
the conflict that unequal distribution generates, systems based on inequality are difficult to
sustain in the long run as they require ever increasing investments in repression.

This analysis has important implications for our understanding of the causes of civil wars in
Burundi and the strategies to achieve peace. First, the analysis helps to clear an important
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confusion that has always plagued the analysis of civil wars in Burundi (and Rwanda for that
matter); that is, the conflation of two distinct phenomena, namely the existence of ethnic groups
and antagonism between ethnic groups. Our analysis considers the existence of distinguished
ethnic groups in Burundi as a matter of historical fact.2 In contrast, we argue, ethnic antagonism
is an acquired phenomenon, arising from biased distribution of economic resources and political
power. This analysis shifts the focus from ethnicity per se to distribution as a primary cause of
civil wars.

Secondly and most importantly, by shifting the attention to distribution, the analysis generates
useful insights about strategies for building lasting peace in the post-conflict era. The analysis
suggests that emphasis should be on policies that alleviate inequality across ethnic groups and
regions while promoting institutional accountability. It becomes clear then that while democracy
is the necessary route to stability, simply replacing one ethnic group by another in the political
hierarchy through blind democratic calculus is not a viable long-term solution to civil wars. This
is to say that institutional reform will not end with the simple establishment of a western-style
democratic system.

Such a system can in fact be counterproductive if it results in the

institutionalization of ethnic dominance, regional inequality, or any other form of bias in the
economic and political arenas.

This paper reviews the evidence in the literature on the causes of conflict in Burundi with the
aim of examining the role of distribution in generating conflict. We illustrate the distributional
2

We do not discuss the issue of existence or nonexistence of ethnic groups in Burundi. We find such an enterprise
fundamentally futile for the purpose of explaining conflicts. The relevant issue is not whether ethnic groups exist or
not but why and how they arise in the complex interaction among multiple factors that cause conflict. Ethnicity may
be a contributor to conflict only if it instrumented for the purpose of controlling power and extracting the rents
associated with monopolization of power
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nature of conflict by examining the role of two key institutions that cemented inequality and
exclusion in colonial and post-colonial regimes, namely the education system and the military.
We examine the conflicts that plagued the post-independence era, namely the 1965 killings, 1972
massacres, the 1988 uprising and killings, the rebel invasion of 1991, and the conflict that
erupted at the assassination of the newly democratically elected president Melchior Ndadaye in
October 1993. The analysis refers to four main historical eras, the pre-colonial and colonial eras,
the reign of the monolithic military republics (1966-1993), and the post-1993 period.

The rest of the paper is organized as follows: the following section reviews the lessons from the
literature on conflicts in Burundi and in Africa in general with an emphasis on the role of
ethnicity, patrimonialism, predation, and institutional failure. Section 3 discusses how civil wars
in Burundi arise from distributional conflict. Section 4 uses the lenses of distributional conflict
to highlight the main economic and political problems that must be addressed in building lasting
peace. Section 5 concludes.

2. Explaining conflicts in Burundi: What have we learned?
The role of ethnicity
The question of the role of ethnicity in explaining conflict in Burundi has occupied a central
place in the literature. Conflicts in Burundi have often been characterized as clashes between
two inherently antagonistic ethnic groups. We argue that this characterization is fundamentally
flawed and inconsistent with historical evidence.
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In his influential book on conflict in Burundi, Lemarchand (1995) pointed out an important
“paradox” in the history of Burundi. He noted that uncharacteristically for a sub-Saharan
African country, ethnic groups in Burundi have a long history of peaceful cohabitation, speaking
the same language, sharing the same culture and having submitted to the same traditional
monarchy. However, in the end of the colonial era and throughout the independence era, the
country experienced conflicts that, on the surface, opposed the Hutu to the Tutsi. Given that the
Hutu and the Tutsi have not always antagonized, the question we must ask is what happened
during the colonial and post-colonial periods that generated violent conflicts along ethnic lines.

Table 1: Ethnic origin of chiefs in Burundi, 1929-1945
GANWA
TUTSI
number %
number %
1929
76
57
30
23
1933
36
78
7
15
1937
35
80
8
18
1945
25
71
10
29
Source: Lemarchand, R. 1994. Burundi:
Cambridge University Press.
YEAR

HUTU
TOTAL
number %
number %
27
20 133
100
3
7
46
100
1
2
44
100
0
0
35
100
Ethnocide as Discourse and Practice. Cambridge:

One source of explanation for why conflict happened is the introduction of ethnicity as a
primordial determinant of access to power starting from the colonial era.

The 1929

reorganization of the territorial administration marked a turning point in the history of the
country with regard to the role of ethnicity in politics. The Belgian colonizers orchestrated an
overhaul of the administration that resulted in the domination of the political system by chiefs
from the Tutsi ethnic group (Table 1). In 1929, 20 percent of the chiefs were Hutu but by 1945
there were no Hutu chiefs in the administration.

This administrative reform marked the

beginning of marginalization of the Hutu in politics. Tutsi domination of the political system
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continued since then and was consolidated especially after the 1972 massacres.

Table 2

illustrates the evolution of domination of the government by the Tutsi. The table also illustrates
the volatility of the political system in the periods leading to and following independence, which
resulted from both antagonism between the Hutu and Tutsi elites as well as factionalization
within the Tutsi elite, especially between Bururi and Muramvya.3
Table 2: Ethnic composition of governments in Burundi, 1961-1993
Government head: name and
ethnic origin
Louis Rwagasore, PM, Ganwa

Duration and fate of
Number of
Number of
Total
government head
Hutu
Tutsi
2 weeks: September 1961N/A
N/A
N/A
October 1961
(Assassinated)
André Muhirwa, PM, Tutsi
18 months: October 1961-June
4 (37%)
7 (63%)
11
1963
(Resigned)
Pierre Ngendandumwe, PM,
9 months: June 1963-March
6 (46%)
7 (54%)
13
Hutu
1964
(Resigned)
Albin Nyamoya, PM, Tutsi
9 months: March 1964-January
5 (38%)
8 (62%)
13
1965
(Resigned)
Pierre Ngendandumwe, PM,
1 week: 7-15 January 1965
6 (40%)
9 (60%)
15
Hutu
(Assassinated)
Joseph Bamina, PM, Hutu
8 months: January-September
6 (40%)
9 (60%)
15
1965
(Executed)
Leopold Bihumugani (Biha),
14 months: September 1965 6 (60%)
4 (40%)
10
PM, Tutsi
November 1966
(Arrested)
Michel Micombero, President, 10 years: December 19665 (36%)
9 (64%)
14 (December
Tutsi
November 1976
1966)
(Overthrown)
Jean-Baptiste Bagaza,
10 years: November 19764 (20%)
16 (80%)
20 (November
President, Tutsi
September 1987
1976)
(Overthrown)
Pierre Buyoya, President,
5 years: September 1987-July
5 (26%)
14 (74%)
19
Tutsi
1993
(1987)
(lost in democratic elections)
Sources: Eggers, Ellen (1997) Historical Dictionary of Burundi. Lanham, MD: Scarecrow Press. Ntibazonkiza,
Raphaël (1993) Au Royaume des Seigneurs de la Lance: Une Approche Historique de la Question Ethnique au
Burundi, Tome 2. Bruxelles: Bruxelles-Droits de L’Homme.
Note: PM = Prime Minister ; N/A = not available.

3

The Muramvya province was the historical headquarters of the kingdom. Under the monarchy, the Tutsi from the
Hima clan were considered an underclass within the Tutsi ethnic group. Bururi contains a large proportion of TutsiHima, the clan of all the former military presidents (Micombero, Bagaza, and Buyoya).
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Ethnic diversity is not a direct cause of conflict in Burundi but ethnicity is intertwined with other
political and regional factors in contributing to conflict.4 On the one hand, the Tutsi-Hima from
the southern province of Bururi exploited ethnic identity to control power. In turn, political
entrepreneurs excluded from state spoils activated ethnic solidarities to challenge the regime in
place. Thus, ethnic diversity became an instrument for political competition in the pursuit of
economic and political advantages. It follows that conflicts are caused not by ethnic diversity
per se but by inequality in the distribution of access to national resources and political power
across ethnic groups. When the political system discriminates along ethnic lines, then ethnicity
becomes a vehicle of conflict.

Patrimonialism, predation and institutional failure
Under the pre-colonial era, leadership was surrounded by the mythical notion of divine power of
the King. The King was above the nation and just under god: “Imana, Umwami, Uburundi”
(God, the King, and the nation) was the traditional order (Ngaruko 2003). Everything belonged
to the King, including material resources as well as the people. This tradition established the
notion that the King not only ruled the country but also owned the country and its resources. A
patrimonial system generates rents that accrue to only those who belong to the “clan” of leaders.
The smaller the clan the larger the individual share in the rents. Therefore, clan members have
the incentives to erect barriers to entry into the club.

4

A similar conclusion has been reached in careful analyses of conflicts in neighboring Rwanda, including studies of
the genocide, an event that has gained world attention and which has by and large been characterized as an ethnic
war. For example, Hintjens (1999: 248) concludes that genocide was not the outcome of “spontaneous outbursts of
mutual antagonisms between ethnic groups.” Fedderke, Luiz, and de Kadt (2004) make a similar argument in the
case of South Africa. They argue that “what really matters is not the [social] cleavage, but that it [the cleavage]
comes to serve as a political tool in distributional conflict” (Fedderke et al 2004: 19). Collier (2000a) finds that
ethnicity has negative effects only in bad political environment (with limited political rights) but has not link with
conflict in democracies. Alesina and La Ferrara (2004) argue that diversity (including ethnic diversity) may actually
increase productivity trough diversity of skills and innovative abilities.
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During the republic era, leaders perpetuated patrimonialism by actively engineering institutions
and mechanisms of exclusion and repression, including the use of force and intimidation against
those who were suspected of not adhering to state ideology. The regimes also used ideology and
propaganda mainly through the party UPRONA (Unité pour le Progrès National), which was
instituted into a unique party during the first military regime (1966-76). The unique party played
the same role as that of myth under the monarchy in brainwashing the public and promoting the
notion of unchallenged submission to the authority.

Two important features characterized the patrimonial state in Burundi: centralization and
penetration.5 Centralization facilitated control over the economy and the political system while
penetration extended control down to the lowest strata of the social structure. The administration
and party leadership from the lowest level to the top were controlled by “agents of the state” who
were accountable to the central authority only. Local officials were often “expatriates” from
other communes and provinces. Officials from the south served as administrators of communes
in the north while the reverse was unthinkable. This institutional engineering allowed the central
authority to control power at all levels in the country. The system also undermined public
accountability on the part of government officials and allowed them to behave like the old King
in that they were above the people and just under their “god”, that is, the central authority.

The state also hijacked civil society organizations to consolidate state ideology. Youth and
women associations and labor unions were branches of the unique party used as propaganda
instruments to brainwash the citizenry and enforce the supremacy of state ideology. State
5

See Laely (1997) for an interesting discussion of the relationship between the centralized state and the peasantry.
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penetration extended even to the clergy. The Catholic Church in particular was viewed as a
potential threat, especially due to its involvement in formal and informal education, which was
seen as a potential vehicle for alternative ideological beliefs. The independence of the church
was nevertheless compromised by the presence of influential clergymen from the South who
often served as arms of the state. The state often was able to take advantage of the trust enjoyed
by clergymen vis-à-vis the people to extract valuable information from or even influence
cooperative behavior of potential opposition leaders.6

While the patrimonial system was effective in repressing potential dissidence it nevertheless
sowed the seeds of conflict by perpetuating alienation among the majority of the population,
namely the Hutu and the non-southern Tutsi. Because discrimination had operated along ethnic
lines, it is not surprising that the subsequent conflicts had an ethnic dimension.

The regional dimension has generally been overlooked in the analysis of conflicts in Burundi.
Integrating the regional dimension allows us to understand why and how ethnicity is not a
deterministic factor of conflict in Burundi (see Ngaruko and Nkurunziza 2000, 2003; Ndikumana
1998).

Ngaruko and Nkurunziza (2003: 384) put it as follows: “Like the ethnic factor,

regionalism appears as a tool which has been instrumented for rent-seeking, the root cause of
civil wars in Burundi.

Ethnic and regional factors complement each other to shape rent

collection and sharing, and none of them can explain violence alone7.” Both ethnicity and
regionalism are related to conflict only because they are dimensions along which power and

6

For example, the very influential Bishop of the Diocese of Bururi, Bernard Bududira, was an important advisor to
military presidents who often used the clergyman’s position to gain access to opposition leaders.
7
My emphasis.
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resources have been concentrated and monopolized.

They are not deterministic factors of

conflict in and by themselves.

The post-independence regimes established true “predatory bureaucracies” (Ngaruko and
Nkurunziza 2003; Ngaruko 2003) aimed at channeling wealth to the benefit of the Tutsi-Hima
elite from the south. Various mechanisms allowed the minority southern elite to gain control
over the economy. One of these mechanisms is through excessive regulation in the economic
system. Excessive regulation allowed leaders to extract rents through bribes and other forms of
corruption. Corruption can be decomposed as follows:8
Corruption = Discretion + Monopoly – Accountability + Hysteresis
Discretion refers to the power of the state to influence the markets, mainly through regulation
and expanded public procurement, which creates opportunities for “commercialization” of the
law through bribery and obstruction of trade through extortion. Monopoly refers to exclusive
control over the economy by the government and the political elite, which, coupled with
monopolization of political power by ethno-regional entities, increases the discretionary power
of leaders, creates an “economy of solidarity”, and promotes the “politics of the belly.”9

Lack of accountability is a consequence of high centralization and concentration of political and
economic power and it is a self-perpetuating process. As Collier (2000b: 197) points out, “once
a society becomes corrupt there are powerful forces tending to keep it corrupt.”

Due to

monopolization of state institutions, corruption became the norm in public management, then
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The last term of the above expression ‘hysteresis’ is from Collier (2000b) while the other terms are from Klitgaard
(1988).
9
The expression “politics of the belly” is borrowed from Bayart (1993).
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corruption became “expected”, and in the end corruption became a self-perpetuating process.10
Corruption is vertically and downward contagious, which takes away not only administrative
accountability, but also moral guilt.11

Excessive regulation serves as a barrier to entry into the private sector for actors who are not
politically connected. It is not surprising that a substantial proportion of those who own large
private companies in Burundi are former high ranking government officials or their relatives
(Ngaruko and Nkurunziza 2003). Concentration of economic power is therefore a result of
concentration of political power.

Another mechanism of redistributive politics is through the management of the public sector.
Ngaruko and Nkurunziza (2000: 386) find that in 1996, the assets of the 37 fully state-controlled
firms represented 48% of the country’s GDP. For all parastatals combined, the ratio was a
staggering 77%. The parastatal sector constituted a channel of distribution of wealth to members
of the southern Tutsi minority. Moreover, the policy of expansion of the public sector suffocated
the private sector while diverting scarce public funds away from socially productive investments.
Since only a select few had access to jobs and command positions in the parastatal sector, such a
policy increased inequality along ethnic and regional lines.

10

Honest behavior (and assiduity at work) by a new public manager is often regarded as evidence of “inexperience”
and excessive zealousness, or “amavamuhira” (literally meaning “the energy of someone coming freshly from
home”). The idea is that once acclimated, a new public manager will “join the club” and start shirking his/her duties
while filling his/her private purse using public resources.
11
In Burundi, the code of wisdom in public service is: “impene irisha aho iziritse” (“a goat grazes wherever it is tied
in the prairie”) or “nta mbwa ikugana igufa mu kanwa” (“no dog barks with a piece of bone in its mouth”). The
message is that it is acceptable (expected) to be corrupt under the blessing of a corrupt leader.
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From the foregoing analysis, we conclude that institutional failure constitutes an important cause
of conflict in Burundi (Ndikumana 1998). The Burundian state has failed to perform its usual
functions of enforcing the rule of law, protecting individual and property rights, enforcing the
rules of fair social exchange, administering justice for all, and redistributing national wealth.
Institutional failure created a divorce between the privatized state and the population while
perpetuating a culture of impunity as well as incentives to capture the state for personal interests.
However, although institutions failed, they have proved resilient to change. Consequently,
institutional failure has created an environment that not only predisposed the country to conflict
but also contributed to the reoccurrence of conflicts. Ndikumana (1998) discusses this argument
in detail.

Greed and grievance
The “greed and grievance” models of civil wars, which emphasize the motives and costs of
organizing and maintaining rebellions, have been used to explain conflicts in African countries
and around the world (Collier and Hoeffler 1998, 2001, 2002).12 Applying the Collier-Hoeffler
model (henceforth C-H model) to the case of Burundi yields important insights into the causes of
conflict (Ngaruko and Nkurunziza 2003). The model predicts correctly that Burundi is more
prone to conflict than the average country in the sample (see Tables 3 and 4). The results of the
C-H model indicate that the average probability of a new war over the 1960-95 period is 26
percent for Burundi compared to about 7 percent for the sample.

12

Also see Grossman (1999) and Horowitz (1995) for a discussion of the greed and grievance model of conflicts.
See Fearon (2004) and De Soysa (2002) for an evaluation of the greed theory of civil war with regard to the role of
primary commodities exports for conflict.
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Table 3: Predictions of the greed and grievance model for Burundi
Comments

Decreases risk

Does the factor make
Burundi safer or riskier
compared to the sample
average?*
Makes Burundi riskier

Income
Growth
Primary exports

Decreases risk
Decreases risk
Increases risk

Makes Burundi riskier
Makes Burundi riskier
Makes Burundi riskier

Social
fractionalization

Decreases risk

Makes Burundi safer

Ethnic dominance

Increases risk

Makes Burundi safer

Peace duration

Decreases risk

Population

Increases risk

Makes Burundi riskier
1975-94; safer in 196074
Same as average

Consistent
Consistent
Primary commodities =
agricultural products
Problematic: incorrectly
measured; does not account
for the political dimension
of ethnicity
Miscoded: Burundi has a
dominant ethnic group,
making it riskier
Incorrectly measured; e.g.,
1965 conflict not recorded

Factor of conflict

Does the factor
increase or
decrease risk?

Secondary male
education

Consistent

--

Geographic
Decreases risk
Makes Burundi riskier
May explain duration of
dispersion of the
conflicts
population
* Note: Assessment based on the average value of the regressor for Burundi compared to the
average value of the regressor for the C-H sample.
However, the C-H model, like other models derived from to cross-country studies in general, has
important limitations in explaining wars in Burundi on any given individual country.13 The
performance of the model is compromised by the inadequate quality of the data for some
important factors of conflict, especially ethno-linguistic fractionalization and ethnic
dominance.14 The index of ethnic dominance used in the C-H data is problematic. First the data
set codes Burundi as not having a dominant ethnic group, which is inconsistent with the fact that
13
14

See Ndikumana and Emizet (2003) for a discussion of the application of the CH model on the case of the Congo.
See Ngaruko and Nkurunziza (2003) for a detailed discussion of measurement errors in the C-H data.
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the Hutu represent a large proportion of the population (about 85%). Changing the dummy of
ethnic dominance from 0 to 1, all else being constant, increases the probability of war
substantially (Table 4). This is consistent with Collier’s argument that dominance, rather than
“fractionalization” is the driving factor for conflict (Collier 2001).
Table 4: Predicted probabilities of conflict in Burundi: ethnicity and peace duration
year
Collier-Hoeffler
Ngaruko-Nkurunziza*
Peace variable
modified
Ethnic dominance = 1
Peace modified and
ethnic dominance = 1
Ethnic groups = 3
Ethno-regional groups
=5
Ethnic dominance =1
and ethnic groups = 3
Ethnic dominance = 1, 3 ethnic
groups, and peace modified

1965-69 1970-74 1975-79 1980-84 1985-89 1990-94
0.362
0.255
0.205
0.223
0.232
0.263
0.630
0.470
0.250
0.280
0.290
0.320
0.408
0.380
0.162
0.178
0.195
0.248
0.479
0.527

0.356
0.498

0.294
0.238

0.317
0.259

0.328
0.281

0.366
0.348

0.304
0.261

0.208
0.175

0.170
0.145

0.191
0.167

0.198
0.174

0.227
0.199

0.414

0.298

0.249

0.277

0.286

0.321

0.461

0.433

0.199

0.223

0.243

0.304

Notes: The probabilities are based on the Collier-Hoeffler “alternative” model which includes as regressors the log
and growth rate of GDP per capita, the level and square of the share of primary commodities exports, social
fractionalization, ethnic dominance, peace duration, the log of population, and geographic dispersion of the
population.
* Note: Ngaruko and Nkurunziza (2003) modify the peace variable as well as the social fractionalization index by
considering 3 ethnic groups.

In the context of Burundi, the quantitative treatment of ethnic fractionalization is problematic
because the quantitative measure does not account for the political significance of ethnicity.
Although the Hutu, Tutsi, and Twa speak the same language, over time they became politically
distinguishable communities, especially starting from 1929 when the colonial administration
engineered the domination of the Tutsi in the administration.

Taking this view that the

differences among the three groups are indeed relevant for conflict, Ngaruko and Nkurunziza
(2003) recalculated the index of ethno-linguistic fractionalization by taking into account the
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relative proportions of each group (85%, 14%, and 1% for the Hutu, the Tutsi, and the Twa,
respectively). This yields a value of 26 for the index (instead of 4 as in the C-H data set).

In addition to ethnicity, regionalism has also been an important dimension of fractionalization
and antagonism in the political system. Burundian politics in the 1960s were marked by sharp
antagonism between the Tutsi monarchists of Muramvya and the Tutsi from Bururi. The postindependence military regimes dominated by the southern Tutsi systematically sought to limit
Muramvya’s political influence. There are also regionalist tensions within the Hutu ethnic group
as non-southern Hutu feel that the Hutu from the south have benefited from “neighborhood
effects” and have been less marginalized than the Hutu from the rest of the country.

Given these considerations, it is more appropriate to think of ethno-regional fractionalization
rather than ethnic fractionalization. Two implications follow. First, fractionalization becomes a
dynamic phenomenon rather than a fixed factor, which helps to better explain the pattern and
timing of civil wars over time. Second, considering ethno-regional entities increases measured
fractionalization and contrary to the theory’s prediction, higher fractionalization makes Burundi
more, not less vulnerable to conflict. To keep the argument simple, we focus on the most recent
war. First, one of the reasons why the war broke out in 1993 is because the monolithic army and
the southern Tutsi elite were unwilling to accept the shift in power concentration away from the
South. President Ndadaye was the first president to be a Hutu, a non-southern, and a civilian.
Second, the war has lasted longer because it has been fought on several fronts, not just opposing
the Hutu against the Tutsi/ For example, the non-southern Tutsi and Hutu have accused the
southern Tutsi and Hutu leadership of shielding the south from the killings while allowing
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destruction of the rest of the country. Non-southern Tutsi have discovered that not all Tutsi are
created equal, and that certainly a monolithic military is not an insurance for any ethnic group.
As the war progressed, ethnic affinity eroded in both camps. It will be harder in the future for
divisionist leaders to simply ride on the back of ethnicity as a way of mobilizing political
support.

3. Distributional conflict
This section explains how the various wars in Burundi arise from distributional conflict and
illustrates the argument with an analysis of two of the main dimensions of the institutional
apparatus that formed the foundation of the politics of exclusion, namely education and the
military. We then identify key factors of each past war that make it a distributional conflict.

Education and distributional conflict
The goal of the education system is the development of human capital, which is achieved by
pursuing two objectives within the limits of the resource constraint: (1) achieving the highest
enrollment ratios or mass literacy and (2) providing the highest quality of education or
sophistication.

For a monolithic regime, mass literacy is perceived as a threat because it

increases the demand for political participation and economic equity. So, mass literacy yields
disutility for the dominant group even though it increases welfare for society as a whole. As a
result, monolithic regimes tend to under-invest in mass education and concentrate resources to
providing the best education to the privileged few.

16

To formalize the idea, let H be the amount of education or human capital accumulation produced
through education. We assume that the society’s utility function is separable into the utility of
the dominant group (D) and the utility of the rest of the population (P). The weight attached to
each component depends on the political power of each group. The function can be written as
follows:
U ( H ) = γU D ( H D , H P ) + (1 − γ )U P ( H P , H D )

(1)

where γ is a measure of the political power of the dominant group.
There are two possible ways of characterizing the optimization process.

First, given the

antagonism between the dominant group and the rest of population, each group’s utility is
increasing in its own human capital but decreasing in the rival group’s human capital. That is,
for the dominant group, less education of the rest of the population is preferred because more
mass education may result in higher pressure for power sharing. For the rest of the population
more education for the dominant group implies more marginalization and an increase in the
political power of the dominant group.

Therefore, the utility function has the following

properties:
U Hi i > 0; U Hi i H i < 0; i = D, P

(2)

U Hi j < 0; U Hi i H j < 0; i , j = D, P

(3)

Since the dominant group has control over the allocation of public resources, it can effectively
influence education for the rest of the population. In contrast, the rest of the population has little
influence on the allocation of resources, which provides incentives to rebel against the dominant
group. Hence, discrimination in education is a potential vehicle for conflict.
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A second way of formalizing the outcomes of discrimination in education is to include the two
objectives of education (mass literacy L and sophistication S) explicitly in the utility function.
Thus the utility function is written as follows:
U = U ( L, S ) = γU D ( L, S ) + (1 − γ )U P ( L, S )

(4)

Since the ruling elite prefer sophistication over literacy while the population prefers literacy, it
follows that:
∂U D ∂U D
∂U D ∂U P
>
and
>
∂S
∂L
∂S
∂S

(5)

These asymmetries in preferences affect the allocation of resources for any given production
technology (production of human capital). For a given amount of national resources allocated to
education, the dominant group will tend to “produce” more sophistication than literacy (point B
in Figure 2) while the rest of the population will prefer to “produce” more literacy than
sophistication (like in Point A). When the imbalance of power is high, that is, with a high value
of γ , the equilibrium combination of sophistication and literacy will be closer to point B than
point A in Figure 2. That is, fewer people will be educated than is potentially feasible given
national resources even though those who do access education will receive a higher quality
education simply because resources are devoted to a smaller pool of recipients. The society as a
whole will be worse off when elitism dominates literacy as an objective of the education system,
which is the most likely outcome in the presence of high inequality in political power.
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Figure 2: Literacy vs. elitist education

Elitism

B: high γ

A: low γ

Literacy
The socially optimal allocation of resources is somewhere between point A and point B in Figure
2, where a sustainable balance between mass literacy and intellectual sophistication is achieved.
In principle, social bargaining between the dominant group and the majority of the population
could induce each group to move towards the “middle”. The problem is that the dominant group
feels threatened by mass literacy because literacy increases competition in the political and
economic spheres. A “gift exchange” mechanism can in principle motivate the migration toward
the “middle”. For the elite, the cost of moving towards the middle is a loss in relative power.
However, point B is socially unsustainable in the long term due to alienation and frustration
among the excluded population. While increasing access to education for the majority of the
population yields stability, the dominant group’s desire to preserve political power induces it to
depress literacy. This largely explains why the southern Tutsi elite in Burundi maintained a
discriminatory education system as a tool of power consolidation.

The military and distributional conflict
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The military, especially its structure and its links to politics, must be at the center of any
objective analysis of post-independence conflicts in Burundi from a distributional-conflict
perspective. The contribution of the military in generating distributional conflict arises from (1)
its structure, (2) what it provides to those who have access to it, and (3) what it represents for
those who are excluded from it. Furthermore, the role of the military is closely connected with
state legitimacy, which also has important implications for resource allocation and political
instability.

The structure of the military in Burundi changed dramatically in 1965. Following the aborted
coup by members of the Hutu elite, the government orchestrated systematic cleansing of the
Hutu in the military and the civilian elite (Ntibazonkiza 1993). From that point on, the military
became largely monolithic.

The Micombero regime (1966-1976) initiated systematic

discrimination against non-southern Tutsi and the military became a monopoly under the control
of the southern Tutsi-Hima elite.

For the southern Tutsi-Hima elite, the military provided a source of rent in the form of political
power, a source of employment, and an avenue to other material advantages from the military
coup by Micombero in 1966 until the establishment of the transitional government in 2001.15
Because of the monopolization of the military by the southern Tutsi elite and its role a guarantor
of political power, public expenditures have systematically been skewed in favor of security to
the disadvantage of socially productive investments such as infrastructure, education, and health
(Figure 3). The bias in the allocation of public resources in favor of security is closely connected
15

Even under the FRODEBU regime of Ntibantunganya from 1993 to 1996, the army had de facto control of power.
The government was kept hostage and paralyzed, which prevented it from implementing any policies that may
adversely affect the interests of the military and its civilian allies.
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to state legitimacy (Ndikumana 2004a). A state that lacks legitimacy invests in security in order
to repress demands for political opening.

This fiscal policy orientation increases the

marginalization of the disenfranchised majority while it promotes rent extraction by the elite in
power, which increases the risk of conflict.
Figure 3: Expenditures on education and the military
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The conflicts of 1965, 1972, 1988, 1991, and 1993-ongoing as distributional conflicts
To summarize our analysis of the causes of conflict in Burundi, we highlight key direct and
underlying causes of the various civil wars with the purpose of identifying factors that show that
these wars arise from distributional conflict (Table 5).
The 1965 killings

The assassination of the Hutu Prime Minister Pierre Ngendandumwe in January 1965 and the
refusal by the King to appoint a Hutu as prime minister despite the landslide victory by Hutu
deputies in the May 1965 legislative elections created political upheaval and poisoned the
relations between the Hutu and Tutsi political elite on the one hand and between the King and
the civilian elite on the other hand. The events demonstrated that the monarch and the elite Tutsi
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were not ready to share power. Furthermore, the Tutsi elite were afraid of a possible repetition
of the bloody overthrow of the King by the Hutu in neighboring Rwanda in 1959. The events in
Rwanda were used to cultivate fear among the Tutsi of an impending danger of extermination in
the event of control of power by the Hutu majority. The alleged coup plot by the Hutu against
the King gave the Tutsi the opportunity to decapitate the Hutu civilian and military leadership.
The 1972 massacres

The overthrow of the monarchy by army officer Micombero in 1966 intensified accentuated the
tensions between the Tutsi from Muramvya (the former royal headquarters) and those from
Bururi. In 1971, rumors of a possible reestablishment of the monarchy, the return of Prince
Ndizeye and his assassination by the army deepened the tensions further. An alleged coup plot
by the Hutu accelerated the descent into chaos. The southern Tutsi elite took advantage of this
chaos to complete the ethnic cleansing of the Hutu from the military and the civil service that
had started in 1965.

The regime also ceased the opportunity to sideline the Tutsi from

Muramvya and the rest of the country. The 1972 war was indeed a distributional conflict in that
the southern Tutsi elite opted for the “final solution” to consolidate their hold on power by
eliminating the Hutu elite.

The 1988 conflict
In August 1988, the country experienced a civil war in the northern provinces of Ngozi and
Kirundo following a long truce of 16 years. What makes the 1988 conflict a distributional
conflict is the role played by state penetration and the resistance to it by the Hutu population. In
the periods leading to the outbreak of the conflict, the government had been warned of tensions
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in the northern provinces of Ngozi and Muyinga between local administrators and the
population. One major area of contention was that these “expatriate” local administrators from
the south were arrogant and insensitive to the needs of the local community. Moreover, the
“wind from the East”, that is, the international drive for democratization energized by the fall of
the Communist block, also contributed to the intensification of mobilization activities by
clandestine Hutu opposition movements.
Table 5: Elements of distributional conflict in Burundi’s civil wars
Civil wars
OctoberNovember 1965

Deaths and refugees
- Deaths: 5,000
(Hutu)
- Refugees:
negligible

Aspects of distributional conflict
- Prime Minister Ngendadumwe assassinated
- The King refuses to appoint a Hutu as prime minister
- Rwanda’s Hutu “revolution” of 1959

April – July
1972

- Deaths: 200,000
(mostly Hutu)
- Refugees: 300,000
(Hutu)

- Bururi-Muramvya antagonism; suspicions of return of the monarchy
- Consolidation of Bururi Tutsi-Hima domination (started in 1966)
- Ethnic cleansing of the military (started in 1965)

August 1988

- Deaths: 15,000
(Hutu and Tutsi)
- Refugees: 50,000
(Hutu)

- State penetration: “expatriate” local administrators
- “Vent d’Est” (wind of democratic change from the former communist
block).
- 18 years of formation of Hutu intelligentsia at home (though
constrained) and abroad: a threat to the regime and an opportunity for
change.

November 1991

- Deaths: 1-3,000
(Hutu)
- Refugees: 38,000
(Hutu)

- Intensification of Hutu opposition (armed and unarmed opposition)

- President Ndadaye declares intension to reform the military: threat to
the foundations of power.
- Rapid dismissal of former government officials: vanishing rent base
- Return of Hutu refugees: threat to “biens mal acquis” (looted
property).
-Scrutiny of business practices (e.g., the case of AFRIMET gold
mining company): threat to rent base
Source: The death toll and number of refugees are from Ngaruko and Nkurunziza (2003) who compiled the statistics
from UNHCR data.
October 1993ongoing

- Deaths: >300,000
(majority Hutu)
- Refugees: 700,000
(Hutu)

It is important to note that from 1972 to 1988, the country had not experienced any violent
conflict. While this allowed the military regimes to consolidate power, it also allowed the
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rebuilding of a sizeable Hutu intelligentsia abroad and at home. As the Hutu intelligentsia
expanded, domestic demand for power sharing increased. This explains the increase in the
intensity of the activities of opposition groups but also the response of the Hutu to repression
after the outbreak of the civil war in the north. Fearing a repetition of the 1972 massacres, the
Hutu intelligentsia decided to challenge the government openly. In a near-heroic move, a group
of Hutu intellectuals wrote an open letter to the President (1) to condemn indiscriminate and
arbitrary arrests and execution of Hutu intellectuals and (2) to demand a national debate on
ethnic discrimination and reform of the political system to achieve egalitarian representation.
The open letter marked a turning point in the history of conflict in Burundi: the intelligentsia had
decided to no longer watch passively as the government security forces slaughter the people as it
had happened in the past. They decided to not only confront the government but to also expose
the tragedy to the international community. These reactions by the Hutu intelligentsia largely
explain why the repression was less widespread and shorter than in 1972. These reactions of the
Hutu intellectuals along with external pressure on the regime were instrumental in the initiation
of the process of political opening, starting with the formation of an ethnically balanced
“government of unity” in 1989, the opening of a national debate on ethnic divisions, and the
ensuing opening of the political process that would eventually culminate into democratic
elections in 1993.

The 1991 rebellion
The invasion by Hutu rebels in November 1991 may be linked to the general dissatisfaction of
Hutu opposition groups with regard to the nature and pace of the political liberalization process
initiated in 1989. These groups accused the government of managing the process to preserve the
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control of power by the southern Tutsi-Hima. The rebellion demonstrated that cosmetic changes
such as having more Hutu in top government positions were not enough to satisfy the opposition
which demanded more sharing in the instruments of power, especially the military. The 1991
events demonstrated also that the Hutu rebellion had changed tactics, opting to confront the
military head on.

The 1993-ongoing war
The ongoing war that started in 1993 following the assassination of President Ndadaye is by far
the most vivid illustration of distributional conflict. Four key factors that illustrate how this war
is a distributional conflict. First, President Ndadaye announced his intention to reform the
military to make it more representative of the ethnic and regional makeup of the society, as part
of his plan to build what he called a Burundi Nouveau (New Burundi). Throughout the period of
transition toward democracy which started in 1989, the military had systematically exhibited
strong opposition to relinquishing power. Secondly, the Ndadaye regime quickly proceeded to
replace former government officials in a drive to establish control of power but also to fulfill
campaign promises. For outgoing government officials and their allies in the private sector,
these reforms meant the loss of the means of extracting rents, which explains the wide support
that the military coup received among the Tutsi civilian elite.

Third, the massive return of Hutu refugees and their demand for jobs and retribution of heir land
and other property constituted a major threat for members of the Tutsi ethnic group who had
appropriated the property of the Hutu who fled the country. Reparation and retribution had never
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crossed the minds of the many Tutsi who had enriched themselves from looting the property of
orphans and widows of their Hutu neighbors.

Fourth, the Ndadaye government was also a threat to the Tutsi business sector. As discussed
throughout this paper, under the patrimonial regimes, connections with the government were
essential for success in the business sector. These advantages were to evaporate with the
institution of a broad-based government.

The nature of the war on the ground and its duration also demonstrate its character as a
distributional conflict rather than just a Hutu-Tutsi conflict. The multiplicity of belligerents
demonstrates that political rivalry matters probably as much as – if not more than – ethnic
rivalry. Political parties and rebel groups have split up as leaders fail to agree on mechanisms for
rent sharing.

4. Making peace work: Strategies for post-conflict reconstruction
The political problem
As we have argued throughout this paper, a correct diagnosis of the conflict in Burundi must
acknowledge the centrality of the political problem, namely the issue of balance of power
between ethnic groups and regions. To achieve lasting peace, the country’s leaders must find
strategies to overcome the legacies of political imbalance. We emphasize three dimensions of
the political problem: the military, ethno-regional balance, and the constitutional process and
independence of the judiciary.
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Building lasting peace will require transformation of the military for the purpose of making it an
a-political institution.

The accord signed in November 2003 between the transitional

government of Burundi (TGB) and the CNDD-FDD for a ceasefire and mechanisms for
organization of the new national defense was a history-making event. The agreement envisages
the formation of a defense force that is balanced at all level. The restructuring process has
already commenced but a few issues remain. The first issue is that the accord does not include
the Front National de Liberation (FNL, National Liberation Front) as this group has refused to
take part into the negotiations. Any progress in the peace process means further marginalization
of this group. The problem is that the FNL still has the capacity to disturb peace even though it
has no chance of withstanding an open confrontation with the restructured national defense force.
For the sake of peace stability it is vital to find ways of convincing if not forcing the FNL to put
down its arms and take part in the new democratic process.

The second critical question is that of sustainability of the army. Attempts to accommodating all
the political tendencies would result in an unsustainable size of the military. This means that a
large proportion of the regular army and the rebel forces needs to be demobilized and integrated
into civilian life. This especially concerns the estimated fourteen thousand child soldiers in the
rebel forces (Ngaruko and Nkurunziza 2003). Downsizing the army is a politically sensitive
enterprise and it can pose a security threat if it is not executed. The country will need significant
financial and technical assistance from the international community to manage the reform of the
army and to finance the demobilization of former combatants.
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The analysis of the causes of the conflicts in this paper implies that the process of peace building
needs to take into account both ethnicity and regional balance in the design of new institutions.
However, representation should not be reduced to mechanical quotas based on the demographic
size of ethnic groups. The objective is to protect the interests of both the majority as well as the
minority groups.

The challenge in the post-conflict period will be to establish agencies of restraint that transcend
political cycles. These agencies are mainly the Constitution and the legal system. The legal
system has always been partisan and served as an integral part of the military regime’s repressive
apparatus. The Constitution has had little meaning due to the universal veto power of the
President. Consolidation of peace will require independence of these agencies of restraint. In
particular, the leadership of these agencies should be either elected directly or confirmed by
representative bodies.

The economic problem
Building lasting peace requires solving a certain number of critical economic problems facing
the country. Some of these problems are part of the causes of conflict while others are a result of
the conflict. But even those economic problems that may seem unrelated to conflict need to be
addressed to ameliorate the standards of living of the population and overcome poverty. Poverty
may not cause conflict, but a solid economy is essential for political stability and peace
consolidation. Poverty produces two effects that are detrimental to peace building. First,
poverty erodes the relationship between the people and the state. A state that is economically
impotent is unable to perform its other essential non-economic roles, including enforcing the rule
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of law. Second, poverty increases the temptation for using the state as a source of wealth
accumulation. When the returns to investment in politics exceed the returns to labor and capital
in the private sector, agents tend to channel energy and resources towards capturing the state,
which inevitably creates instability and leads to conflict. Consequently, economic performance
is a vital ingredient for building lasting peace.

Even as the country struggles to finance its immense reconstruction needs, its limited resources
are drained by debt service. In 2003, Burundi spent 65.8 percent of its exports revenues on debt
service, up from 39.3 percent in 2000. By comparison the government spent $3 per capita on
health care in 2001, but paid $5 per capita on servicing debt owed to official creditors alone.
Even as debt accumulated, less funds stayed in the country while large proportion of the
resources were transferred abroad (Figure 4). Official development aid and other forms of
official assistance dried out since the start of the 1993 conflict.

The best way for the

international community to help Burundi achieve lasting peace is to write off its debts and to
increase official development aid to finance economic recovery.16 Debt write offs and new aid
obviously should be conditional on commitment to democratic governance by the new
leadership. In particular, implementation of the Arusha and Pretoria accords should be a key
criterion for aid disbursement. Pressure for debt write-offs for post-conflict reconstruction has
gained momentum with the United States’ pressure for cancellation of Iraqi’s debt on the basis of
the odious debt doctrine. Obviously the same argument applies to the majority of developing
countries, including Burundi.17 The population of these countries should not bear the burden of

16

In Ndikumana (2004b), we argue that debt relief alone will not be enough to help developing countries “graduate”
from aid dependence. Debt relief should be accompanied by increases in aid to allow developing countries to grow
faster and increase their rates of saving and investment.
17
See Boyce and Ndikumana (2003a; 2003b) for a detailed discussion of the odious debt argument.
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debts that were used to finance regimes that oppressed them. The recent decision by the G8
government to write off more debt for HIPC countries is a promising sign. However, more needs
to be done to enlarge to pool of relief recipients and to establish mechanisms that prevent new
cycles of debt crises.
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Figure 4: Burundi: Debt indicators and ODA (million US $)

200
1975

1980

1985

1990

1995

2000
0

-50
Official net resource flow s (mill US$)

Net transfers on debt (mill US$)

Aid per capita (US$)

debt stock (mill US$)

Education
In the post-conflict era, education policy has to pursue two objectives that are equally important
for peace building: increase the efficiency in resource allocation to maximize human capital
formation and promote equity in access to education across ethnic groups and regions. We
emphasize two strategies that could help in this transformation of the education system. The first
strategy is to design and implement a financial aid scheme for college education. Since recently,
there has been an expansion in private higher education in the country, which has contributed to
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alleviating pressure on the public university. However, private universities are expensive and the
majority of the population cannot afford them. Moreover, nowhere in the world has any country
been able to establish a solid higher education system without a network of first class public
universities. With the support of the development assistance community, the government needs
to establish a subsidized loan program that allows all academically qualifying students to afford
education. The government will need to design mechanisms that allow maximum repayment of
student loans to ensure sustainability of the program. The second policy is to increase the
decentralization of secondary education by increasing subsidies to district high schools (collèges
communaux). Foreign assistance to education should consider the two objectives of reform of
the education system as central to decisions regarding allocation and disbursement of
development assistance.

5. Conclusion

We have argued that unequal distribution of national wealth and monopolization of power are the
primary causes of civil wars in Burundi. Civil wars do not just happen; even the existence of
potentially antagonistic groups need not generate conflicts.

Civil wars are the result of

discrimination and exclusion, which in the case of Burundi operated not only along ethnic lines
but also regional lines. Moreover, just as conflicts do not just arise, they need not reoccur.
Conflicts will restart when their root causes are not addressed. These root causes need to be
addressed by implementing economic policies and institutional reforms aimed at achieving
equity in access to power and national resources. The overriding goal of these reforms should be
the protection of the rights of all groups, minorities as well as majorities.
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While the new Burundian leadership bears the burden of crafting and implementing political and
economic reforms, the international community also has a critical role to play for the success of
these reforms. Given the long history of patrimonialism, certain interest groups may invest in
protecting the privileges acquired under the old regimes and sabotage the reforms.

The

experience of 1993 with the assassination of the democratically elected president demonstrated
that this legacy of patrimonialism is a serious constraint to policy reform. The international
community can use its leverage through financial aid as well as military intervention to contain
such sectarian tendencies on all sides.

The international community should also assist in financing peace building and economic
recovery.

However, politically blind interventions are detrimental to peace building.

The

development assistance community should scrutinize the distributional impacts of foreign aid.
For example, aid to education can play a critical role in helping the country to correct the effects
of the legacy of exclusion.

In particular, the country would benefit immensely from aid

channeled to funding complete decentralization of high school education and a student loan
program for tertiary education. Such an orientation of aid to education would serve to alleviate
the pressure on the government budget and contribute to equalization of educational
opportunities across ethnic groups and regions.
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